GETTING CREATIVE INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES THEIR DUE: 

FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATIONALIZING ARTICLE  8 J AND 10 C

Convention on Biological Diversity provides for the first time an opportunity to break the nexus widely observed between the biodiversity and the poverty.  It is recognized that one could not conserve biodiversity by keeping people poor even if historically biodiversity survived only under such conditions.  Studies have shown that many of the communities which conserve diversity have remained poor because of their superior ethical values.  The challenge before us is to modify our own ethical positions. And at the same time ensure that with improvement in the livelihood prospects through the implementation of CBD, the communities will conserve diversity along with associated ethical and cultural values.  

The rate of erosion of the knowledge of biodiversity was never so high as it is in the current generation.  Knowledge erosion is even more serious threat than the resource erosion. Conserving the biological diversity without conserving associated knowledge systems is like building and maintaining a library without a catalog.  It is true that users of such a library over a long period of time may in fact develop a catalog.  But such a catalog would not benefit from the centuries of experimentation and knowledge accumulation by the local communities and indigenous people.  It is true that formal scientific knowledge of plants and animals is quite diverse and rich.  However, the dimensions on which different communities have classified and organized their knowledge as well as practices, are far more complex and dynamic.  

There are three crucial assumptions in this paper (a) not all knowledge, innovations and practices prevalent in a community are communal in nature.  That is there are individuals who have great expertise in various aspects of local knowledge not known at all or known only partly  to the local community.  (b) Not all the knowledge in use by a community is traditional in nature.  There are large number of examples of contemporary innovations by the local communities developed collectivity or individually (c) one could  not  conserve  biological  diversity without conserving cultural diversity. The implications are obvious.  Any scheme of incentives to be viable and sustainable will have to provide a mechanism for growth and development of traditional as well as contemporary knowledge system held by individuals as well as groups and in a diverse manner. One could not think that same or similar incentive structure or philosophical assumptions will provide adequate motivation to conserve what exists and restore what does not.  

SRISTI and Honey Bee Network have been involved in the documentation, experimentation, and dissemination of indigenous knowledge, innovations and practices in the agricultural and animal husbandry sectors for the past six years more formally but for last 16 years informally    (through individual efforts of various SRISTI members). This work brought us close to the farmers especially in Gujarat where we used a variety of methods to document more than 5300 innovations/practices from 2300 villages (SRISTI, 1996) but also in other parts of the country (Haryana, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh etc.,). In addition we have documented innovations from different parts of the world particularly Vietnam, Mongolia, Columbia, Ecuador, Tanzania, Cambodia, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, North and South American Indian communities etc., and have disseminated the grassroots innovations through Honey Bee newsletter in more than 75 countries. We have probably the world's largest database on grassroots innovations with name and addresses of the innovators (individuals or communities) and communicators in most cases. 

The challenge of devising appropriate incentives becomes even more difficult when we realize that many of the local communities do not have access to some of the basic needs and are quite impoverished.  Several factors have contributed to this linkage between greater biodiversity and poverty (Gupta 1991a, 1991b, 1993).  A global initiative, SRISTI (Society for Research and Initiatives for Sustainable Technologies and Institutions) takes note of the following factors (Gupta, 1991, 1992, SRISTI, 1993):

(a) The biodiversity is high in these areas, primarily due to diversity in soil, climate and other physical and social structures.

(b) The poverty is high because markets are often unable to generate demand for diverse colors, tastes, shapes and qualities of natural products.  Products of mass consumption particularly when processed by machines have low variability because throughput by machines has to be of uniform quality.

(c) The regions of high diversity also have very poor public infrastructure (just in tandem with weak private market forces) because the people have limited surplus to attract public servants, and they are less articulate and organized to create political pressure (except through insurgent movements as is becoming evident from different parts of the world).

(d) The low demand for ecological and technological skills of these communities characterizes them as ‘unskilled’ labor fit for being a part of the urban slums, squatters or other similar work force. Once the knowledge system is devalued, the cultural and social decline follows.  The tenuous relationship with the nature is ruptured. The ecological degradation spurred by various external resource extractors is aided and abetted by many poor as well as not so poor people for whom survival in short term seems possible only through eco‑degrading strategies.

Not only is the mean income of these areas low, but the variability in income is very high. This makes these areas most vulnerable to external exploitation (Gupta, 1981). These households would have such varieties of crops which are vulnerable to environmental and market fluctuations leading to generation of very low surplus.  The livestock breeds though are well adapted to the environment, suffer huge loss due to drought or disease epidemics.  The fluctuations in the non‑farm sector also similarly impair the capability of household adjustment. In fact most of the households with such portfolios would have deficits in their budget (Bharadwaj, 1974,Gupta, 1981,1983, 1989).  Their dependence on other social groups and informal institutions like moneylenders or traders is enormous.  Their vulnerability often acquires highly exploitative forms dividing them into different sub‑groups of mutually conflicting identities.  Collective action, for economic purposes, among such people is at times extremely difficult.  For cultural and social purposes, they have perhaps one of the strongest indigenous institutional infrastructure.  Their tacit knowledge base is very rich though it contains many images of self which are not very positive. There are, however, exceptions, particularly among artisans and pastoralists.  Such groups may have a stronger self image and are also less vulnerable in regions where some demand for their products exists. The risks spread over space, sector and season or time also need to be appraised carefully to understand the evolution of institutional or individual solutions. Many of these solutions are very creative and innovative. Their relation with nature is often the strongest because they are most dependent on it. 

Would  these  communities  continue to bear this  burden  in  the future?  The combined effect of the formal educational system as well as high external input farming technology  especially in the green revolution areas has led  to  the devaluation  of local knowledge systems in cropping systems             (Richards,1985,Gupta 1989,  Atte  1989). Though in livestock and tree based systems in arid and forest regions, large number of people continue to hold the local knowledge systems in high esteem. Our studies have also shown that erosion of traditional knowledge has also been much slower in such regions mainly because the formal scientific knowledge systems could not produce many successful technologies and practices to replace the local adapted ones. Even in green revolution regions, the indigenous veterinary knowledge was found to be quite buoyant though the crop related local knowledge had eroded a great deal. The weakness of formal animal health system became the reason for survival of local knowledge. Can these two knowledge systems be blended?

Singh and Varma (1969) had asked such a question about the continued relevance of the indigenous knowledge in a specific context of animal husbandry. That question could still be asked because the mainstream educational and public policy system still does not give due attention to the peoples knowledge system.  One implication of this is the downgrading of the knowledge system in the eyes of young people of the same community.  Once esteem goes down the incentives for young people to acquire that knowledge and experiment and rejuvenate the same also go down.  This leads to serious discontinuities in the inter‑generational flow of knowledge. Once the "local experts" (see part two of the paper) of the older generation are gone there are no substitutes and the knowledge held by those individuals in trust for future generations is lost forever. 

The failure of the state delivery system in consulting local communities, including local experts, before implementing large scale projects intended for the development of the rural poor, has often led to adverse impacts on the livelihood  /survival strategies of the local communities. The existence of perverse incentives has also blocked space for local innovators and conservators interested in developing and promoting sustainable natural resource practices. The near absence of legal and institutional framework to implement incentives for biodiversity conservation has led to over‑exploitation of diverse biological resources by the corporate sector (without compensating the indigenous people in any way) as well as by other users like forest corporation, traders, small scale pharmacists and also in some cases by local communities. 

Local communities struggling under the pressures of population, and the failures of both market mechanisms as well as state delivery systems have often resorted to the use of sub‑optimal livelihood strategies (annexure one). Given the magnitude and complexity of the situation there is an urgent need to develop global and national strategies for conservation of biodiversity as well as indigenous knowledge, innovations,  practices and lifestyles that favour biodiversity conservation.  This is precisely what Article 8(j) of the CBD, read with Article 10 (c) proposes. In this paper we outline such an operational strategy. 

The paper is organized in four parts.  In part one, we describe the dimensions of knowledge system and explore the incentives that will help in sustaining different kinds of knowledge systems and/or their functions.  We also discuss different kinds of innovations triggered by varying motivations as well as stimuli.  The typology of different types of practices, particularity skills is discussed to suggest mechanisms that can maintain, and or augment or transform these skills.  The second part of the paper deals with the mechanisms to conserve the culture and lifestyles which are closely related to any local/indigenous knowledge system.  In part three, we discuss a whole range of incentives for contemporary as well as traditional innovations and highlight the bearing different types of institutions and technologies have on the suitability of these incentives. We also discuss the criteria by which different incentives can be operationalised in different locations and institutional settings.  We must stress that to conserve this diversity and associated knowledge embedded in local cultural systems, we cannot follow a uniform approach.  The thrust of this paper therefore is to provide a variety of instruments for a whole range of socio‑cultural and institutional settings, so that member nations can take initiatives at local, national, regional and global levels through their own resources as well as through globally mobilized resources.  

Part 1: Knowledge systems for survival and sustainable biodiversity management

It has been generally believed that knowledge system of local communities and indigenous peoples is quite holistic in nature.  Centuries of association with an environment has produced a deeper understanding of interrelationships between different elements of a landscape or a habitat.  Since fluctuations in the environment required adaptive response, communities developed a whole range of diversified survival strategies at intra and inter‑household level and at communal level.  However, contrary to the conventional belief, the local/indigenous knowledge system has had both holistic and reductionist  elements  though much more of the former.  In order to cope with the scarcity, complexity and simultaneity of ecological changes, some people in the community specialize by knowing more and more about less and less.  Expertise requires development of focussing, targeting and steering strategies over a specific theme or aspect of nature. A good archer may be good because he/she does not look at all the inter‑connections between target and the world around it. The degree varies. So called western science is biased in favour reductionist relationships just as local knowledge systems are biased in favour of systemic linkages and holistic perspective of nature. But if efficiency has to increase for coping with increasing population pressures (where applicable), scarcity of the resource supply, fluctuation in the environment or the other contingencies, blending of formal and informal science may be necessary.  The sustainability in resource use requires fusing sacred with secular, formal with informal and reductionist perspective with the holistic view.  

The production of knowledge and its conversion into practice through innovations over a long period of time takes place in a given socio‑cultural and ecological context.  It has been suggested that this context influences and to some extent shapes the world views of people which in term influences the heuristics used for generating new solutions and knowledge (Pastakia, 1995).  The heuristics are like decision rules which also are accompanied with criteria of choice.  Many times it is not realized that local/indigenous knowledge system are not static in nature.  The knowledge systems evolve, adapt and transform dynamically over period of time.  New materials are incorporated, new processes are developed and sometimes new uses or purposes are evolved for using existing knowledge as well as new knowledge. It is for this reason that we submit, there is a need for rewarding not just the traditional knowledge but also the contemporary innovations.  We also submit that the concept of Traditional Resource Rights ( Posey, et al, 1995) does not do full justice to individual and contemporary sources of creativity and innovation. Our fear is that by impersonalising the entire process of knowledge production and reproduction, only such incentives will be considered which will provide resources either only in the hands of the governments or in rare cases the local community leaders. It is unlikely that the communities which kept most of the local healers poor by not valuing their knowledge systems adequately will pass on the externally generated incentives to such individual experts who have reproduced this knowledge (if not produced in all the cases). The assumed homogeneity of local communities and supposed convergence between the interests of local community leaders and that of local experts in every case is difficult to accept. How asymmetry in knowledge systems as well as power differential manifests in discourse on incentives becomes apparent from the nature of consultation process that has been followed with so called representatives of indigenous communities so far. Almost in all meetings held so far on the subject, the representatives of indigenous communities from west have dominated the discourse both in terms of numbers and ideas. It is not our contention that these communities have not suffered in past or that they should not be heard. But any one familiar with the miserable conditions in which most third world tribal and non tribal communities conserving biological diversity and associated knowledge systems live, it will become obvious that their problems and concerns are very different from the ones articulated at these international fora. The concerns of the local experts and innovators with in these impoverished communities may even be further different form the rest. How do we get their concerns heard and addressed is major purpose of this paper.

It is not surprising that most of the international consultations and studies on knowledge systems (Singh and Vera, 1969, Atte 1989, Netting 1972, 1981, Marglin, 1990, Sankhya Yoga, 7 A.D., Gupta, 1980, 1987,1989, 1991‑96 etc.) suggest the need to distinguish between different types of knowledge. What these differences are may not however, be agreed upon. For instance knowledge belonging to the present life and the one belonging to future state or ethereal matters has been distinguished in Indian Knowledge systems (para or apara gyan).  Similarly, knowledge could be practical or abstract, etic or emic, techne or episteme, formalized or informal, utilitarian or non‑utilitarian, segmented or recombinable or non‑malleable, etc. (Atteh, 1989, Netting, 1980, Gupta, 1987, Marglin, 1989).  Some of these dimensions reflect in the nature of technologies that people developed.  The theoretical knowledge could include concepts, principals or abstract conjectures or propositions.  

Categories of practical knowledge could on the other hand, include discriminating/ classifying, attributional or characterisational, associative, causal, functional, knowledge about limits or boundaries and about systemic linkages, etc. It is true that these types are not mutually exclusive and each knowledge bit may have all these attributes. It is just that the different incentives may be able to nurture different dimensions. Similarly both formal and informal sciences are capable of producing abstract as well as practical knowledge, although the latter  (informal science) tends to produce more of the practical kind.

These dimensions are not mutually exclusive.  Same knowledge systems could simultaneously pursue each of the functions though describable in various combinations.  For instance a fishing community may have to use classificatory skills to deal with the variance in the movements of fishes, their egg laying sites, nesting sites etc. They may use the indicators for spotting the sites where fishes would be found at different times of the year in higher proportion.  They have to use systemic linkages to relate temperature, wind velocity, turbidity of the water and behavior of the fish to decide how far to go in the ocean without courting too much of risk or uncertainty.  Since most knowledge systems dealing with nature whether formal or informal are probabilistic in nature, there are times where despite all the care and caution, fishermen and women loose their way and sometimes their life.  One way to understand the complexity of knowledge system is to link the functions of nature with processes of sense making.  The diversity, complexity, simultaneity and change in ecological systems (Gupta, 1989) are codified in knowledge and practices through language and culture.  Just as Eskimos are supposed to have highest number of words for classifying the snow, the fishing communities may have very large number of words for distinguishing and discriminating different kinds of waves/ spawning sites etc. Conceptually one can submit that any community which is dependent upon a resource for its survival, has to develop a pattern or a set of categories to deal with the variance in the behavior of that resource.  Therefore farmers should have a rich taxonomy of clouds and soils and in some cases insects and animals, the leather workers would have a taxonomy of leather, carpenters would have for wood and likewise other communities.  

In the context of CBD it very important to understand and appreciate that different indigenous and local communities develop knowledge systems through a tradition of invention and also develop a language to articulate the knowledge system.  If a language dies, a knowledge system partly or completely also dies with it.  

Conservation of language becomes a crucial factor for conserving taxonomies because each of the words, conceptually speaking in the context of a natural resource, is a category.  Modern science will benefit a great deal and so will our ability to understand the environment and cope with it, if we understand the science underlying these categories. Etymological roots of different words may provide the process of codification of knowledge over time in nay language as influenced by exogenous knowledge systems through migration, wars and other social intercourse.

It has been suggested that formal science in its effort to generalize over large time and space boundaries, often subsumes finer categories.  The indigenous knowledge systems often do the opposite.  These systems help in distinguishing small variations in a phenomena but within a, relatively speaking, small habitat.  Higher local fit implies very low negative externalities on the environment but it also means an inability or limited ability to deal with wider connections.  For sustainable development of our planet, we need both telescopic and microscopic visions. That is the ability to see connections among larger systems and also an ability to appreciate interconnections at a micro level system.  We need both, the reductionist science and the holistic vision.  It must be remembered that if everything is connected to everything else, no causal statement can be made.  

That is the reason we distinguish between functional and causal knowledge systems.  Farmers have been known to do right things some times for wrong reasons.  The practice does not therefore become invalid merely because the supposed causal connection is invalid.  Even in modern science, there are several medicines which are known to be effective but whose causal mechanism came to be known much later.  For instance, aspirin.  A knowledge system should not therefore be downgraded merely because of above limitations.  The rituals and some of the symbolic totems may be a way of constraining a particular healing strategy lest it is used in inappropriate cases, doses or situations.  The marriage between local and indigenous knowledge and the formal and informal science will succeed only on the basis of reciprocity respect and a well deserved restraint in opening up the logic.  For instance the sacredness of certain sites, species and symbols will have to be respected even if a modern mind finds these institutional structures incomprehensible or even irrational.  Collegiality can only spring from mutual respect.  

Knowledge production and reproduction systems: 
 
In the light of above complexities, Knowledge production and reproduction may  not  follow  similar processes. The production may be through creative problem solving at small scale or in episodic manner, or through interaction with external world/ knowledge systems. Hence knowledge gets added  to the  local  pool mainly through two routes a)  local   innovation resulting  from serendipitous discoveries, trial and error  methods, systematic experimentation, validation (trials over time and space),  etc.,  and b) interactions  with  external  world/actors, networking with kith and kin, networking with external  partners, etc.  

Knowledge  reproduction on the other hand may take place  through scaling  up process, or testing of an idea in a different  place, time or context from the one where it originated. Hence the  same solution  may be tried by the same person or different person  in different  context  or for different problem or  at  a  different scale.  These dimensions are important because the  institutional support needed would vary depending on these dimensions.

In a dynamic knowledge system some knowledge gets depleted as  it becomes  redundant over time on account of the  changing  perceptions  of needs, access to resources, and changes in  the  socio‑ ecological conditions. However, in a vibrant culture, much of the knowledge  is passed down from one generation to another depending upon social structures and needs of changing times. Knowledge related to livelihood strategies is embodied in practice. Once the livelihood strategies themselves undergo change due to reduced or modified access to the underlying natural resources (as has happened in most developing countries) 

Cultural  knowledge is embedded in rituals, folk lore, art and other cultural and social artefacts and processes etc.  Some other  specialized forms of knowledge may be reproduced by  local experts. Knowledge  embodied in Practices: Usually this takes the form  of skills  which are mastered through practice. The skills could be of different types:  repetitive and  non‑repetitive  including judgmental. Judgmental skills may be relatively scarce and  individuals  possessing  such skills may over time be  recognized  as local  experts.  Examples of such skills  would  include  weather forecasting,  judging the quality of diamonds (diamond  polishing using  labour intensive methods has grown into an  important  off farm employment in many of the villages of Gujarat) cattle judging, diagnostics for human, animal and soil or lakes systems,  etc.

Paul  Richard's  work on indigenous knowledge systems  has  often highlighted  the  performance aspect of indigenous  knowledge  as compared to that of formal systems (see Richards, 1987).  Performance  from the indigenous perspective could include a number  of criteria  not  considered by formal science as relevant  such  as risk  bearing ability , contributions to system  maintenance  and soil  health etc. The practices could have  different impacts  on the  natural resource base of the community. Practices  could  be resource  conserving,  restoring, augmenting or  even  depleting/ degrading.  Incentives for resource conserving  and  augmenting practices could be different from the ones suitable for  resource reclamation. 

Knowledge Embedded in Culture:

Indigenous life style is a reflection of the indigenous world view. World views in turn are influenced by the changes in knowledge and value systems on the one hand and by the changes in socio‑ecological context on the other. The values serve as guides for dealing with each other, with sentient beings and with nature and super‑nature. Traditional knowledge embedded in culture and embodied in practice serves as the mechanism to preserve and pass on livelihood strategies to future generations.

Communities give  expression to their belief systems, norms, values, and ideologies through folk art, crafts and rituals, taboos, myths, symbols etc. These values are also reflected in their livelihood strategies which are also closely woven with local institutions, social networks, kinships networks and knowledge systems.

Typology of Local Experts

Given the asymmetry of knowledge, experience and wisdom within and among communities, some  individuals  or communities in  possession  of  specialized knowledge  /skills  become  local experts. The following  is  an illustrative list of such expertise:

     Local expert	Type of Expertise	
     Taxonomists	Classificatory knowledge 	
     Herbalists	Functional, attributional knowledge	
     Ecologists	Knowledge about system inter‑linkages, 
boundaries, niches, holistic knowledge	
     Reclamation Experts	Causal,  functional,  integrative knowledge	
     Plant and animal breeders	Integrative knowledge, special skills 	
     Human and animal healers	Causal, functional knowledge	
     Semiotist	Symbolic, associative knowledge	
     Navigators	Knowledge of boundaries, geographical knowledge	

Okoth‑Owiro and Juma (1996)  Refer to an IDRC  report (1980)   which classifies healers into four categories, viz.: (i) pure herbalists,(ii) herbalists‑ritualists, (iii) ritualists‑herbalists, (iv) spiritualists.  The emphasis varies in each case on the process, product and the spirit.  The authors suggest that the technical knowledge of the healing properties of plants was socialized.  The art of healing, they observe, was not in fact a privatized knowledge nor was the knowledge of the material.  They conclude that the present legal arrangements were not conducive to the survival of the indigenous knowledge and were not suitable for protecting the legitimate of communities (and perhaps also of the individual healers) in the knowledge of traditional medicine and the task of the genetic conservation.  They stress that the laws relating to intellectual property needed to be modified.  But even more important, they rightly aver, is the issue of strengthening the traditional natural resource management which provides the context for knowledge system to grow and evolve.  

The typology of  experts draws our attention to subtle dimensions of knowledge system for strengthening which appropriate institutional mechanism will have to be created.  A whole range of new options become open when we look at the loci of strengths of local knowledge systems.  This section was begun with the discussion on the need to recognize the role of individuals in communities.  Lest we are misunderstood, it must stress that one possible reason why young people are not imbibing the skills that various local experts embody, could be that they do not feel honored or rewarded in pursuing these careers.  If we do not develop incentives which make the expert skills worth pursuing, we will continue to witness the decline of skills and the demise of one expert after an other without producing the next generation of leaders and experts.  Without questioning the merit of the argument about social context of indigenous knowledge, we cannot ignore the fact that the same context has proved inadequate in generating sufficient self‑worth among young people so as to pursue these skills.  What is interesting about some of these skills is that new careers options become available when we look at their significance.  For instance, the skill of restoring the health of the degraded lands opens new opportunities for combining relevant articles of desert convention and Forest action plan with CBD.  

The ecological context in a given region or for a given community defines the nature of environmental risks or threats.  A drought, a flood, erosion of biodiversity or increase in salinity levels in coastal areas due to ingress of sea water may be different kinds of threats.  The regions which have very low level of threats are preferred by markets and even state and, therefore, are advantaged in most respects.  Given low transaction costs of exchanging resources in these regions, the adaptive response of the households is fast.  At the same time, in view of the prevalent value system, the social structures are also different compared to the disadvantaged regions having higher perceived risks or threats.  In table 1 we have enumerated the key contrasts that characterize the advantaged (market dependent) and disadvantaged (nature dependent regions).  The market dominated communities are the ones in which most exchanges are mediated through markets, institutions and instruments.  The commoditisation of labour, product and skills is quite high.  In contrast, the communities which draw their major sustenance through use of natural resources often without much value addition are defined here as nature dependent communities.  The regions where each type of communities predominate are also contrasted here.  The market dependent regions are the high growth green revolution regions.  On the other hand, the nature dependent regions are rainfed drylands, hill areas or forest fringe areas.  

Table 1

                         		Market dominated     			Nature dominated

1. Communication system         		Digital         			Analogical     

2. Pooling of  resources              	Very low         			Very high      

3. Reliance on  common 		Low             			Very high      
    properties                                              
                                                           
4. Settling of books of A/c            	Very short term			Long term      

5. The proportion of                                       
    women headed or           		Very low         			Very high      
    managed households                                                
                                                           
6. Women                     		Very low         			Very high      
    participation rates              
                           
7. Reciprocities             		Specific         			Generalized    
                                                           
8. Empowerment               		Material        			Knowledge resource
                             			resource‑        			and culture‑based
                             			based

Source: Gupta, 1992, 1995
 
One particular dimension of above contrast between market dominated and nature dependent communities and knowledge system is worth highlighting.  The communication system in the nature‑ dependant communities is often analogic in nature compared to preponderance of digital communication in the market‑dominated communities.  The analogic communication refers to metaphorical and symbolic means of communications.  Many of the local experts have a symbolic language through which they communicate their understanding of a problem.  Many scientists and policy planners  who have not appreciated the analogic basis of communications used by the local experts have jumped to the conclusions that expertise involve more of mumbo jumbo than actual skill.  In soe cases it might as well be but to generalise the entire package of traditional knowledge and contemporary institutional context as the one may be unfair.

Conservation of knowledge, skill, practice and spirit of innovation cannot take place without looking at the socio cultural and ecological context of the knowledge system.  Incentives only in the material form and only in the short run will not help in changing the context of biodiversity conservation.  In management science we always argue that without changing the context, we cannot change the content.  A small story will illustrate it.  

Akbar was a Mogul King during fifteen centuries and was very popular among his subjects due to his secular orientation.  He had a minister called as Birbal.  The minister was very quickwitted person.  Akbar and Birbal used to play games of one‑ upmanship.  Each one would try to prove that the other was not very intelligent.  Once Birbal asked the king that did not he believe in the dictum that as the king, so were his subjects.  Akbar replied of course, that it was true.  Since he was a wise king, so should be his subjects.  Birbal suggested that they should test this assumption.  He wanted to prove that Akbar was not very wise king, though of course in the lighter vein.  Birbal drew a line on a paper.  He asked the king to announce to everybody whether anyone could shorten the line without erasing it.

After several days and weeks, a child came forward to do the trick.  He drew a bigger line adjacent to the earlier line.  The original became shorter.  

What was changed was the context.  What got changed was the content.  The incentives for biodiversity conservation have to be seen in the change context discussed in the earlier part of the paper.  It should be noted that no one incentive will be appropriate for all situations within a community or across the communities.  Hence the need for tailoring or contextualising the content of the incentives.  

III  Incentives for conserving knowledge, innovations,  practices and lifestyles:

Communities and individuals who have conserved biodiversity for  so long have done it not entirely on the basis of an  utilitarian logic. The efficiency of ethics sometimes may be  tempered by  the  inefficiency of technology. That is, the method  of  extracting  biodiversity could be sometimes less conducive  to  the long  term conservation of a species, even though the  norms  and values  guiding  the extraction may be very efficient.  Once  the ethical  values, cultural norms and belief systems  become  weak, the  inefficiencies  of extraction methods may  start  generating negative feedback effects. That is, the restraint for  extracting diverse resources within their sustainable limits becomes weaker. The  important  point to note is that  improvement  in  technical methods  may not necessarily lead to evolution or restoration  of ethical norms. The challenge thus is to devise such an  incentive system which fulfills four conditions of sustainability ‑ (1) The access  to  biodiversity for local communities  to  ensure  their sustainable  livelihood systems should take priority over  access of  outside institutions or individuals, (2) Assurances to  individual healers or other local experts, communities and other stake holders  to  have sustained access to the  resources  and  viable collective responsibility for using biodiversity, (3) blending of traditional  skills/abilities to convert  biodiversity  resources into investments with or without value addition  (4) Conservation of  cultural lifestyles and value systems in such a  manner  that basic needs are met without impairing the life support systems of local communities.

A Plea for Global Registration of innovations, traditional knowledge and practices: 

INSTAR (International Network for Sustainable Technological Applications and Registrations)

SRISTI has been pleading for a global registration system akin to Honey bee network of grassroots innovators for last several years but particularly since 1989 when the Honey bee network was start‑ ed  and  reinforced later several times  (Honey  Bee,  1990‑1996; Gupta,  1991, 1995; SRISTI, 1993). Subsequently, the Third World Network  also  endorsed this idea as a part of their  proposal  on community  Intellectual property rights but they  had  restricted the scope of such a registry only to the collective knowledge. We have argued from the beginning that innovations are produced  not only by collective groups but also by individuals and not just in long past but also in the contemporary times. 

It will be possible to achieve the following results from such  a registry:

	i)	Acknowledgement of individual and collective creativity

	ii)	Grant entitlements to grassroots innovators for receiving a share of any returns that may arise from  commercial  applications of their knowledge,  innovations  or practices with or without value addition

	iii)	Linking the golden triangle of entrepreneurship by linking Investments, enterprise and innovations. Small scale investors in North and South can not afford to go to various  countries, scan diversity of knowledge and resources, negotiate contracts and invest up front huge investments for value addition. If they do not participate, then the field      will remain dominated by only large corporations. This register will help small scale investors seek opportunities of communication with communities and individual innovators and explore opportunities of investment. large number of potential negotiations will take place increasing the opportunities for innovative communities and individuals.  The competition among the investors tempered by competition among potential suppliers of a various kinds of knowledge as well as diversity will moderate expectations on both the sides. 

	(iv)	An autonomous authority of which local community representatives will be the majority members could be entrusted with the responsibilities of having access to all the contracts. A copy of the contracts may have to be deposited with this Authority so as to avoid short changing of the communities. These contracts will also be scrutinized to see whether management plans for sustainable extraction of diversity have been drawn up n scientifically appropriate manner or not. Penalties may have to be imposed for non‑sustainable extraction of herbs by domestic as well as external extractors.

	(v)	Each entry in the Register will be coded according to an universal system like ISBN. The postal pin code of the habitat of the community or individuals registering innovations will be incorporated in the indexation system so that geo‑referencing of innovations can be done. In due course the contextual information of innovations can also be incorporated in the system so that GIS (Geographical Information Systems) of innovations can help cross connect the communities having similar ecological situations or    facing similar constraints or challenges.

	(vi)	The entry in the register will in the first stage be mere acknowledgement of creativity and innovation at grassroots level. But later some of the innovations will be considered      appropriate for award of inventors certificate or a kind of petty patent which is a limited purpose and limited duration protection. Essential purpose of this innovation also is to enable the potential investors (a cooperative of consumers, producers, an entrepreneur, or a large firm  in private or public sector) to seek local innovators and reward them through market mechanisms tailored appropriately by state regulatory mechanisms.

	(vii)	The award of certificate will also increase entitlement of innovator/s for access to  concessional credit and risk cover so that transition from collector, or producer of herbs to developer and marketeer of value added products can take place in cases where innovators deem that fit.

	(vii)	The registration system will also be part of Knowledge Network linking problem solving people across the world at grassroots level (see discussion on Knowledge network in the  later section, Gupta, 1995, IFAD, 1995). This will promote people to people learning and serve as a multi‑language, multi level, multi media (oral, textual,  electronic) clearing house for local and indigenous communities. Wherever necessary and possible, formal scientific institutions will be linked up in the network with local individual and community experts.

Apart  from  the registration system a large number  of  specific incentives would need to be developed for different categories of knowledge,  innovations and practices. Similarly  the  incentives for preservation of sustainable lifestyles of indigenous communities  would also be different. In the following four sections  we provide a shopping list of incentives under different categories.

Linkages with Desert Convention (ICCD) (Gupta, 1995)

In this context, operationalisation of various articles of International Convention to Combat Desertification, particularly Article 16(b), Article 18, Article 19 and 20(c & d), Article 25‑ 3(a), Article 26, etc., in order to network existing information channels so as to make innovative solutions accessible to people in a manner that they can use these and share feedback/feed forward.

The Article 16 of Convention deals with information collection, analysis and exchange so as to accomplish (a) early warning, and advance planning for adverse climatic periods and (b) practical applications to deal with these variations by the people.  It suggests that information needs of the local communities and decision makers are addressed through various ways of information networks integrating physical, biological, social and economic indicators.  Article 16(d) suggests use of expertise of governmental and non‑governmental organizations for dissemination of information.  Article 16(g) provides for exchange of information on local and traditional knowledge, "ensuring adequate protection for it and providing appropriate return from the benefit derived from it, on an equitable basis and on mutually agreed terms, to the local population concerned".

The important caution which needs to be exercised in this regard is about "mutually agreed terms".  People providing their knowledge whether traditional or contemporary may not always be able to fully assess the terms at which they should agree to share it. Many times, because of their superior ethical values, they may share it without asking for any reciprocity.  Under such circumstances, the values of the receiver would determine whether or not he/she would provide any share in the benefits to the source/s of the knowledge.  To avoid such an asymmetry in the exchange of information, I have argued that developed countries should enact a protocol or country specific legislations which should require every company/individual in private or public sector to declare that the product or process being protected is based on knowledge collected `lawfully' and `rightfully'. 

Thus, even if a developing country does not have a law or institutions to implement a law regarding adequate protection for local and/or traditional knowledge, it will be the responsibility of the user in developed country to declare how the knowledge was collected fulfilling not just the legal requirement but also the moral requirement.  Otherwise, it may be legal to take the knowledge of the community or an individual innovator in a country where law to the contrary does not exist but could it be called `rightful'?

The provisions of Article 16(g) of ICDD can be combined with Article 8(j) and 15.5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  In addition to the sharing of benefits, the concept of prior informed consent will also need to be operationalised.  

Article 18 talks about transfer, acquisition, adaptation, and development of technologies for mitigating the effects of drought or combating desertification.  It implies that parties undertake on mutually agreed terms and according to their respective national legislation and/or policies, promotion, financing and other functions of transfer, acquisition, adaptation and development of environmentally sound, economically viable 
and socially acceptable technologies.  

The problem in this regard would be similar to what has been faced in operationalizing the respective provisions of CBD  on the subject.  The developed countries may not like to transfer biotechnologies without adequate payment and in some case not at all to safeguard their strategic export interests.  But, they may like to continue to have unhindered access to the germplasm in developing countries.  In the context of ICCD, situation may be as follows:

Large number of plants from which vegetative dyes can be made for clothes or leather may be found in dry regions.  These dyes may be in great demand because of pollution hazards and human allergy caused by synthetic dyes.  How will the knowledge and resource be exchanged in a manner that provider as well as receiver see it in their mutual interest that resources are conserved? 

Article 19 and  20 deal with capacity building, education, public awareness and financial resources.  The knowledge centre has to play a direct role in fostering the use and dissemination of local knowledge, innovations, etc., primarily, "through innovative ways of promoting alternative livelihoods including training new skills", etc (particularly Article 19‑d, h, k).  

Article 20 provides for financial mechanisms for achieving various goals through Global Environmental Facility or other means for Africa as well as other affected developing countries.  Article 20(d) draws attention to the role of foundations, NGOs and other private entities to bring about debt swaps as well as other innovative means of reducing external debt burden of affected developing countries, particularly in Africa.  To operationalise this provision, Knowledge Centre/Network   would have to mobilize and network financial nodes for this purpose.  Knowledge Centre can create pressure on the global institutions by periodically sharing information on how the trade, environment, technology and  resources have been made available for the purpose.  

A    Incentives for Different Types of Knowledge:

Different incentives may be appropriate to conserve different dimensions of knowledge, as indicated in Table 2.  For instance classificatory knowledge owes its very existence to diversity in nature.  Hence various ways of preserving this diversity in situ or ex situ would be the first step in conserving this knowledge. Documentation of local taxonomies and identification of local taxonomists would be some of the later steps. 
 
Eco‑indicators are an important form of associative knowledge and could act as early warning signals of desirable or undesirable natural events. They could also be of help in coordinating the strategies of competing claimants of the same resource niche. For instance the flowering of Tseb plants indicate to the Yak herders in Bhutan that it is time for them to go back to higher altitudes so that cattle herders coming up from the plains do not meet the yak herds. also the pastures grazed by yak could regenerate by the time the cattle arrive. It is undertook that some diseases could be transferred from cattle to yaks and thus these should be kept separate. During summer the yak move to lower altitude up to 4000 feet while cattle move up to avoid the heat of the plains. Herders hundreds of miles apart are able to coordinate their movements over time and space without the help of sophisticated equipments (Gupta and Ura 1992). Knowledge of species or their behaviour which serve as eco‑indicators would be an important incentive for the communities which rely on them for various functions to conserve the same. Acquisition of this knowledge would be an incentive for other communities which may not have such a means to regulate collective behaviour.

Sometimes local innovators use heuristics, which are very different form those used by researchers in formal science. For instance in a recent study of grassroots innovations for sustainable pest management, (Pastakia 1996) the author found two heuristics not found in the formal research on pest management. One was the exploitation bio‑chemical interaction between a plant and an insect pest for generating a repellent of the same insect. Another unusual heuristic was the treatment of seeds of the crop with buttermilk in order to generate metabolites within the plant system which would prove toxic to invading pests. Scientists in formal research institutes may well be able to extend the frontiers of science and of pest management technology by applying these two heuristics to come up with new eco‑friendly pesticides. If they do so there is a case for compensating the original innovators. Since there would be practical difficulties in providing  legal protection for heuristics, it may be left to the moral discretion of the scientists to provide suitable compensation to the farmers from whom they learnt about the new heuristic. The least they can do is to acknowledge them in publications arising form the new discovery/ innovation. Though once the protocol for International Registry for Innovations and Traditional Knowledge is recognized and legitimized, the incentives for heuristics as process innovations may also accrue.

Table 2

A.          Incentives for different types of Knowledge 

Knowledge Type                          				Incentive

I)  Reductionist

1.   Discriminating/	   			maps of soils, trees etc. in  local 
     Classificatory           				taxonomies, data banks that are 
                              				accessible to the local  innovators 
                              				or conservators in local  language, 
                              				gene  banks  which  serve  as  safe 
                              				deposit  vaults  for  the   farmers 
                              				conserving germplasm in situ, local 
                              				herbarium and museums that are 
                             				linked  to  local  ecological   and 
                             				taxonomic systems;   botanical  and 
                             				medicinal  gardens  in  schools  or 
                             				common  property lands,  employment 
                              				for local taxonomists etc.

2.   Attributional            				biodiversity   competitions   among 
                              				school  children; providing  career 
                              				scholarships  to little genius  for 
                              				studying  as long as they  wish  to 
                              				become naturalists: inviting  local 
                              				experts to school to impart observ‑
                             				 ational  skills  (with  or  without 
                             				 honorarium); compensation for 
                              				ethno‑botanical knowledge  provided 
                              				to outsiders etc.

2.   Associative              				documentation of eco‑indicators, 
                             			 	some  of  which could  be  used  as 
                              				early warning signals

3.   Causal                   				Using  causal  knowledge  of  local 
                              				experts as vital inputs in projects 
                              				for restoration of ecological 
                             				balance, reclamation of degraded 
                              				lands; grassroots environmental 
                              				health monitoring units managed  by 
                              				local communities etc.

4.   Functional               				adding value to functional knowl
                              				edge by converting it into technol‑
                               				ogy and /or discovering the science 
                               				behind   it;  strengthening   local 
                               				capacity   to  carry  out   on‑farm 
                               				experiments,   creating   community 
                               				laboratories   or  research   farms 
                               				managed  by  creative  communities; 
                               				venture capital grants etc.

5.   Heuristics                				Congregational: getting them to
                           					gether; compensating local  innova‑
                              				tors  when  scientists  use   their 
                              				heuristics to make new discoveries
                              				traveling seminars of local ex
                              				perts; narrative‑metaphorical learn
                              				ing  stimulated through  small  and 
                              				large group interactions

II)  Holistic

6.  Knowledge about          			Consult local experts while target‑
     limits/boundaries        			ting  new  technology,   conserving 
                              				specific  species or habitat  since 
                              				they have knowledge about  ecologi‑
                              				cal niches

7.   Systematic linkages      			consulting local experts during 
                              				ecological    crisis;    conserving 
                            				linkage between sacred and secular;

B.   Incentives for Conserving Knowledge in Practice

Karimbhai of Banaskantha district in Gujarat is a very good herbalist.  But he earns his livelihood through pottery and does  not charge any amount for dispensing herbal medicine. Pottery  involves repetitive skills while as healing requires mostly judgmental skills.  In such a case incentives for pottery whether through technology, new materials, design or access to markets may help reinforce the ecological ethics underlying free dispensation of herbal medicine. Similarly a trust fund may be set up under  the sole authority of such a healer (to act as a gatekeeper for external resources) for the benefit of the community.

The incentives for judgmental skills would be very different from those of repetitive skills. Although learning aids, manuals,  and audio‑visual aids may help certain skills involving judgment such as  valuing diamonds, judging cattle, predicting rains  based  on meteorological observations etc., are very difficult to acquire by reading or viewing films or through other self‑learning means. In such cases apprenticeship and mentoring may be the most effective means.  In  addition to the skills, the learner  acquires  values underlying various judgments. Various countries can provide incentives to Local experts to accept some apprentices as mentors.

Restorative skills may involve integration of knowledge of causal relations, associative knowledge, functional knowledge as well as knowledge  of system linkages. The Kutchi Patel community is  one which is known for its expertise in reclaiming marginal soils for agriculture.  Wherever  they migrate form Kutch  to  villages  in north  Gujarat,  they  buy marginal land at a  low  price.  After working on the land for about five to ten years they are able  to restore  the  soil health and make it productive again.  At  this stage  they  prefer to sell the land at premium and  move  on  to reclaim  more marginal lands. As of now the only  incentive  they have  is  the price incentive. However, their expertise  could  be taken  advantage of in the design and implementation  of  schemes for land improvement by the land development corporations and other such agencies.

Conservation or augmentative skills may be repetitive on judgmental. These may often be associated with culture and institutions.  Hence conserving eco‑ethics in this case becomes as important  as conserving the skill itself.

Table 3

B.   Incentives for Conserving Knowledge in Practice

1.   Repetitive skills       				vocational training centers; master 
                              				trainers; community workshops which 
                              				could serve as arenas for  exchange 
                              				of  skills; new materials,  designs 
                              				or access to new markets;conserv‑
                              				ing cultural institutions that help 
                              				generate regularity in pattern 

2.   Judgmental skills        			apprenticeship; monitoring; manuals 
                              				to  aid learning; audio‑visual aids; 
                              				periodic clearing house  for unique 
                              				case discussions, providing regional, 
                              				national and  international opportun‑
                              				ities to local experts for participa‑
                              				ting in such case clinics and 
                              				conferences

3.   Conservation/            			community incentives for CPR 
     augmentative             				structures;   strengthening    eco‑
                              				ethics  of individuals;  demonstra‑
                              				tion  of  economic  gains;travelling 
                              				seminars

4.   Restorative              				removing market imperfections/ or 
                              				distortions so that prices reflect 
                             				the real value after restoration of
                              				resource  to  original  levels   of 
                              				productivity;  engaging  as   local consul-
                              				tants  and trainers for  government schemes

B    Incentives for Local Contemporary Innovations:

Innovations  could  be the result of either individual  or  group efforts. Sometimes  the personal ethics or cultural norms prevent the  individual from accepting material rewards or  compensations for their contributions to society. Their superior ethics  should not  be a valid reason for their continued state of  poverty.  In such cases non‑material incentives would be appropriate also  incentives  could be targeted at the community level,  which  would enhance the material well being of the entire community.  Targeting  compensation to the community would also be  appropriate  in cases  where the innovation could not be traced to  a  particular individual but to a community.

The  matrix  resulting from the interaction of two  variables  a) nature of reward, whether material or non‑material and b)  target of reward, whether individual (including group of individuals) or community provides the framework for designing the incentives for promoting innovations (Gupta 1995).

                                                                  Forms of Reward

				Material	        Non-material	

                  Individual

Target 
Of 
Reward

                  Collective 

                                       High

                  Degree of Involvement 
                      
                                                                 Low 

                           Table 4

C    Incentives  for Local Contemporary and  Traditional  Innovations

I    INDIVIDUAL ‑MATERIAL

     1.   Protection of property rights ‑ patents
                                        ‑ registration scheme
     2.   User fees
     3.   Awards, fellowships, research grants
     4.   Voluntary contributions from users and civil society
     5.   Pension schemes 
     6.   Allotment of land equipment and other resources  needed 
          for further experimentation and innovation

II	INDIVIDUAL ‑ NON‑MATERIAL

	Documentation, coverage in press, TV and other media Public felicitation, e.g. doctorate from formal research institution ‑ as was recently given to Prafull Chandra in Karnataka (Honey Bee 6.4) Invitation to lecture in schools, centres of learning and research. Invitation to conferences, workshops attaching name of innovator to the innovation (an incentive frequently used by the local communities themselves).  Local titles e.g., "krishi sant" for Bhaskar Save, one of the pioneers of natural farming in Gujarat National titles e.g. Krishi Pandit, Padma Sri etc.  Membership of Parliament, Expert Committees on Resource Use Photographs being placed in Gram and Taluka Panchayats Access to new skills.

III  COMMUNITY ‑ MATERIAL

     1.   Risk funds
     2.   Trust funds
     3.   Priority  in  the  development  of  infrastructure  e.g. 
           schools, health care system, access roads etc.
     4    Free or easy access to data banks
     5    Access to external expertise
     6    Community award
     7    Community grants/ risk funds 
     8    External aid in developing CPRs
     9    Marketing intervention for organic produce

IV   COMMUNITY ‑ NON‑MATERIAL

     1.   Greater control over local natural resources
     2.   Rights to self‑determination
     3.   Removal of perverse incentives for conservation
     4.   Favourable policy environment for eco‑friendly products
     5.   Favourable policy environment for conservation practices
     6.   Recognition to community: media attention, community awards
     7.   Greater negotiation skills
     8.   Capacity building through transfer of technology

The  magnitude, manner and form of incentive or benefit  may  influence  the  degree of involvement of the local  communities  or individual innovators in future projects of biodiversity  conservation.

*	Incentives could be in cash or kind, conditional (linked  to research) or unconditional
*    	Community incentives could be of direct nature or they could be indirect. They could be provided at one point in time  or over an extended period of time.
*    	Incentives could be provided by external agencies or by  the local  communities  themselves. The improved status  of  the innovators on account of social recognitions may or may  not be  associated  with greater say in decision making  at  the societal level.
*    	Incentives may focus on empowerment of local communities  so that  they  may have better negotiating  skills  and  better knowledge for conservation of local resources. Alternatively the  incentives  may be targeted directly  at  conservation. Incentives  targeted at community may lead to action either at the community level or even at the individual levels.

1) Material ‑ individual 

The biodiversity and associated knowledge systems may thrive through various kinds of innovative initiatives of individuals.   A private farmer may own a large ranch or a small forest which may have some unique biodiversity.  Some of the feudal lords who may have been legitimized in the form of aristocrats or other allied roles may posses huge tracts of grazing lands.  In some cases, the royal families may own unique habitats having unusually rich biodiversity.  For instance, in Bhutan, the royal family owns large tracks of grazing lands as well as forests which are only resource of its kind in the given geo‑physical niche.  The natural forest have been devastated on both the sides of Bhutan along that latitude around the globe.  Were it not for the enlightened conservation royal policies of Bhutan government and prudence of local communities, humanity would have lost rare and unique biodiversity residing in this parallel. But will Bhutan be able to conserve this diversity indefinitely if the global community does not pay the price of foregone income to Bhutan or other such countries.

The incentives for conserving such biodiversity could be in material form and for individual use (though if the incentives are ploughed through external assistance such as aid from OECD countries, there is no justification to reinforce land inequities. In Bhutan the enlightened Kingdom has modified the  concept of sanctuaries to include people's rights living in them to be protected. Thus though lands may have been owned privately, the incentives so far have not been utilized privately).  If the incentives are only short‑term, it is possible that strategy of conservation may or may not be sustainable.  If short‑term investments develop capacity for generating long term revenues through non‑extractive uses of biodiversity, then such incentives will fall under this category.  A good example is investment in eco‑tourism in some countries.  The equity implications of these investments have to be carefully weighed.  

The individual ‑ material rewards conventionally include the patent rights, license fees and other forms of remunerations for individual creativity.  In many non‑OECD countries, there is a considerable misconception about what patents do or do not do.  The historical role of reverse engineering in various developed countries in the early phase of development is cited as a justification for continued weak regime for intellectual properties.  To some extent there may be some truth in this logic.  However, given the economic squeeze and deficit budgets, most developing countries compete for foreign exchange through investments rather than borrowing.  Many times flow of technology and resources to various developing countries may be impeded because of weak protection for intellectual properties.  The incentives for biodiversity conservation unfortunately have not been linked with the efforts to strengthen IPR regime for individual or firms. Obviously the incentives for firms cannot be justified without similar incentives for farmers, non farming tribal or other communities. 

i)	Patent information system at decentralized level to promote participation of small scale sector in new ventures.  

	The information about patents will serve three conventional purposes, i) it will help investors identify ideas which are out of patent and  can be commercialized easily, ii) prevent duplication of R&D and re‑discovery of the wheel, and iii) encourage investors to negotiate with the patent holders for local manufacturing base.

	However, the information system will also serve at least two non‑ conventional purposes, iv) make communities and individuals aware of their rights if infringed by any patent and v) encourage innovative communities and individuals to file patents for the improvements they have brought about in their knowledge to generate new products and processes.

ii)  	To develop low cost decentralized system of registration of innovations/inventions (as argued herein earlier). It is well known that many innovations known to a small community or individuals may not be easily accessible to outside users and thus could not be considered as a part of state‑of‑art.  The registration system could be relevant for individuals as well as groups and may generate a clearing house for potential investors to contact the concerned inventor/s for possible commercialization.  Thus, conditions for material reward will be generated for corporate communities or individuals. 

	This idea has to be implemented hand in hand with the concept of Knowledge Network so that people to people communication of innovations does not get less importance than the goal of commercialization. 

iii)	Public watchdog committees to monitor and ensure sustainable extraction of biodiversity.  

	The monetary incentives to individuals could also lead to excessive extraction of a resource.  A good example is excessive mining of ground water because the power charges are often collected on the basis of horse power of engine and not actual power consumption.  Such a system also does not provide any incentive for using energy efficient technologies.  The watchdog committees may have to be financially supported for regulating and disseminating information about the scale of extraction of a resource.  Special incentive may be provided to individuals who either generate substitutes for products derived from endangered species or provide mechanisms for application through biotechnology, clonal propagation or tissue culture.  A wild plant may thus get domesticated and thereby generate opportunities for increasing income of people without extraction of resources from the wild.  

Voluntary Incentives: In addition to above externally induced incentives, there can also be incentives of voluntary nature.  For instance, some one who develops a public domain software may ask the users to contribute a given amount to the developer if they are satisfied.  Voluntary contribution, we all accept, may take place very infrequently.  And yet there are large number of people who continue to develop and share public domain softwares.  Likewise, this is a model where individual who develops a value added product may make the information a public domain for those who want to replicate.  But those who do not want to undergo the hassle of developing their product, may buy it from the producer.  An innovator Mr. Upleshwar developed a herbal pesticide based on the recipe evolved by his teacher Dr. Rahudkar who in turn had drawn inspiration from traditional knowledge (Pastakia, 1996).  Mr. Upleshwar wrote down the formula on the school walls in the village for anyone to copy and also sent pamphlets to large number of other villages and districts.  Those who wanted, could have made it themselves.  However, his experience was that large number of people preferred to buy from him rather than make it themselves.  This is an example where material individual incentives are generated in the market place through combination of voluntary and entrepreneurial spirit.  A fund for helping such ecopreneurs undertake market research, product development and some additional R &D  exercise could be set up.  

The individual ‑ material incentives can also be generated by providing rewards to those who develop innovations which help in conservation of biodiversity.  For instance, there are many medicine men and women who do not charge for their services, as a result their superior ethics makes them remain poor.  If the incentive for sharing technologies and keeping them in public domain are matched by the public support for public sector and community R&D, awards for outstanding scientists (formal as well as informal) may be one way for recognizing this contribution.  

2) Material ‑ collective

The incentives in this category could be most meaningful in the co‑operation between OECD and non‑OECD countries.  The purpose of such incentives is to recognize that creative activities may require support not just at individual but also at group level.  Further, even this support to individuals may in some cases be routed through group processes. Four kinds of incentives be designed to promote creativity and innovation in conservation of biodiversity such as: a) venture capital support, b) risk cover through insurance, guarantee and risk funds, c) trust funds with or without individual leadership, and d) infrastructural development in the economically disadvantaged biodiversity rich regions etc.

i)   Venture Capital Funds

Our research has shown that considerable opportunities exist for scientists or firms in formal sector for combining new technology and investments.  However, similar facilities do not exist for small innovators anywhere in the world to the best of our knowledge.  Perhaps this gap is a natural corollary of the gap that exists around the world in having databases on local innovations.  Honey Bee database is an exception.  In the absence of venture capital fund, large number of innovations either do not become products or services or remain at the level of idea itself.  The linkage between invention and enterprise requires support from formal science as well as investment agencies.  If this support is of the conventional banking kind, several innovators may not have risk bearing ability to borrow at market rate of interest.  A venture capital fund, on the other hand, assures the inventor that no loss would be caused to her.  The fund would share the profits, if any, either through equity participation, partnership or one time payment by the innovator.  Large number of natural products for which demand exists remain out of the market perhaps because incentives and infrastructure for scaling them up in a fair manner do not exist.   

SRISTI Venture Capital Fund was set up on experimental basis to try to learn by doing.  OECD countries could help in setting up a network of such venture capital funds entirely dedicated to development of natural products by small innovators (individuals or communities).  In some cases, assistance in market research, product development, testing, etc., may also be required to link local creativity with global markets.     

ii)  Risk Cover

Many communities are unable to make transition to sustainable land use in case they have been following resource degrading practices because of inability to take risk involved in the transition.  Further, acquisition of new technology whether for production, conservation or value addition will also involve risks.  In case naturally occurring herbs have to be cultivated, the on‑farm research may have to be done which of course involves risks.  Even if non‑extractive enterprises such as livestock or agriculture have to be developed in marginal environments for people relying on biodiversity extraction, the whole process of developing these alternatives may involve considerable risks.

To encourage financial institutions to lend to scattered population at lower rate of interest may mean higher transaction cost as well as risks.

To cover various kinds of risks described above, OECD countries can help develop international guarantee fund, risk funds and insurance cover.  

iii) Trust Funds

The ethical values of many local communities as well as individuals are such that individual as well as collective monetary rewards in lieu of knowledge are shunned.  Obviously one cannot justify such communities or individuals being kept poor because their ethical values are superior.  Trust funds are a way of providing revolving funds or expandable resources to local communities for local conservation and employment generation.  These funds could be managed by local communities or one of the biodiversity experts/herbalists who could act as a gatekeeper for these resources.  In that sense, such funds also help to empower local experts.  It remains to be seen whether such empowerment would encourage younger people to emulate such experts and help in keeping the knowledge tree alive.  The trust funds can also be used for local market development, processing or adding value to local herbs or aquatic diversity or for providing small loans at low rate of interest to members of the community.  The idea is to break the vicious circle of poverty which prevents such communities from coming out of poverty ratchets.  

iv)  Support for infrastructural development/Common Property Resource Development

Whether it is watershed development or re‑generation of common property resources or conservation of collective sacred groves, local savings or resources may not always be sufficient for the purpose.  In addition, some new infrastructure may be required for education, marketing, processing, storage etc.  In some negotiations between corporations and local communities infrastructural development emerged as one of the important demands from the local communities.  However, one has to be sure that the kind of infrastructure which is developed as a form of collective reward/compensation does not generate two kinds of problems.  One that it absolves the government or local bodies of their responsibility in the matter and second this process distorts the local community relation by emphasizing far too much on the preferences of only dominant sections.  For instance, it is possible that the elite may demand motorable road while the disadvantaged women might prefer drinking water facility ( Gupta, 1994).

The basic needs of every community should be met as a matter of human right regardless of whether it conserves biodiversity or not.  What we are suggesting is that in addition to meeting local needs such funds should also be used for supplementing the infrastructure.  

One area which could widen the choices of local communities is access to databases of alternative uses, technologies and resources which can help improve the local livelihood strategies without impairing the ecological balance.  Many times developmental professionals have tried to romanticize the relationship between local communities with local resources.  Just as no one community can solve all technological or institutional problems successfully, likewise no community would be totally insulated from outside resources and influences.  The challenge is to make it possible for local communities and individuals to access and negotiate external resources at reasonable and fair terms.  This may require building capacity for negotiations with outside biodiversity prospectors.  Since ability to negotiate would depend upon access to alternative information, development of such knowledge networks/databases may be extremely helpful in empowering local communities (Ethical Guidelines for accessing  and exploring Biodiversity developed by Pew Conservation Scholars appended to this note cold be a starting point).  

There could be many other kinds of incentives for conserving biodiversity in material form and for individual purpose but mediated through collective institutions.  For conservation of land races of different crops, several schemes can be devised depending upon whether the diversity is concentrated in few pockets or scattered, or has high or low degree of variability within populations.  Not every grower of land race can be given incentive every year for every plot of land race.  Because if incentive is too small, it will not bring about any perceptible change in the behaviour.  One way to increase the size of incentive per household is to develop a system of lottery.  Assuming that 500 hectares exist under a particular land race of which 50 hectares (10%) need to be conserved, 50 lottery vouchers of one hectare each could be selected by the lot for allocation among different farmers.  These 50 farmers should get difference of value in the productivity of their land race vis-à-vis high yielding variety multiplied by the price difference.  Thus, if a farmer got ten dollars per quintal price and only 10 quintal yield with local land race as against 20 quintal yield of the high yielding variety sold at 15 dollar per quintal.  Then the farmer who gets the lottery voucher would get (15x20) ‑ (10x10) that is 200 dollars.  If it was to be distributed among all the 500 farmers either one would need lot more resources and if resources are same a farmer would get hardly 50 cents which will make no difference to one's decision making profile.  

Many more variants of this scheme can be developed to provide individual material incentive but through collective institutions.

3) Non‑material ‑ individual

It is recognized that there are large number of individuals who either do not care for material rewards or do not consider such rewards as a major motivation for their decision to conserve diversity.  In such cases owner, respect and recognition in local as well as national functions may provide significant motivation to conserve natural diversity.  

Biodiversity conservation and promotion funds can be set up in different parts of the world for not only celebrating unique efforts of individuals or collective institutions but also to publicize in local language such contributions.  The essential point here is that various ways of recognition by peers as well as society at large may help in generating the right kind of role models.  Reference to such individual innovators and conservators in various media may also provide encouragement to such individuals.

4) Non‑material collective

A whole range of measures can be taken up in short‑term as well as medium term. The changes in curriculum and pedagogy are one of the most important candidates for consideration.  It is well known that the food consumed, by the disadvantaged communities even when nutritionally superior, is considered inferior in the formal knowledge systems.  In fact many of these millets grown in dry regions are actually called inferior millets.  Obviously, if young minds don't learn about the contribution local individuals or communities make towards conservation it is unlikely that they will develop respect for such behaviour. Policy changes in the regulatory as well as managerial systems is another way in which incentives can be generated for various local communities.  One of the specific ways in which non‑ material collective interventions can help is by modifying consumer preference as well as producer incentives for organic cultivation.  In some cases, it may come under material collective if the facilities for organic certification are developed collectively.  However, such facilities will also be accessible to individuals.

It is well known that much of the production in drought prone regions, hill areas or forest regions is organic in nature and primarily not by choice but due to compulsion.  If organic certification facility can be developed along with market channels then incomes of such communities can be increased without impairing local eco‑compatible land use.  The consumer will also be benefited through availability of safer foods.  

C:    Incentives for conservation of Culture/lifestyles

One of the most contentious issues is the goal of conserving  traditional lifestyles without denying the opportunity to local   communities and individuals to improve their living standards.   While  the question of resettlement of Lambadas, a nomadic  tribe  of Rajasthan was being considered immediately after independence,  the  then Prime minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru questioned  the  wisdom  of  preserving them as "windows into antiquity".  He  believed that they should become  rightful partners in the  process  of development. However he also realized that the pace of  development  could not be such that the socio‑cultural fabric  of  the  community was pulled apart.

It is also assumed that traditional communities are always egalitarian  and  fair  to different section of  the  community.   Not  disputing  the  rationale of,"keeping hands  off"  strategies  in  certain   situations, markets have an extraordinary  capacity  to  penetrate the most interior pockets. And market forces are  often  ruthless and thus leave no quarter for local cultural  sensitivities,  spiritual  beliefs or conservation strategies.  State  can  obviously  neither regulate external  interventions  sufficiently  nor insulate local communities from external influences. However,  mechanisms  can  be created such that local communities  are  not  penalized  and  short changed because of their  superior  ethical  values, generous attitude and willingness to welcome any  outside  exploration (Table 5). This in short is the fundamental issue  in  operationalising Article 8(j) and 10(c) of CBD. The nexus between  poverty and biodiversity has to be broken. 

Table 5

D    Incentives for conservation of Culture/ lifestyles

Lifestyle                     				preserve identity of minority 
                              				communities ‑legal framework
                              				enhance livelihood opportunities
                             				at site in order to reduce out 
                              				migration 
                              				reservations/ quotas to be phased 
                              				in a time bound manner,                               

Rural eco‑tourism 

Belief systems/               				ensure freedom of religion
Ideologies                    				protection of religious and 
                              				cultural symbols, places

Rituals                       				protection for symbolism and 
                              				appelation of area of orgin for
                              				products

Crafts                        				new markets (e.g. vegetable dyes 
                              				could be used on all toys as they 
                              				are safe for children), new designs

Institutions and              				documentation, media coverage,
Bio‑ethics                    				strengthening local institutions 
                             				such as sacred groves

Culture/ folklore             				sponsoring folk performers to 
                              				perform at schools, and other
                              				public fora,
                              				developing centers of excellence
                              				or cultural heritage centers
                              				schools for teaching folk art
                              				introducing folk art in school 
                              				curricula
                              				"gyan van" as living museuam and 
                             				exhibition or `Knowledge Forests'
                              				of local plant species and their
                              				various local uses ‑ functional, 
                             				cultural, aesthetic etc.

The argument that if people accumulate wealth they might become less concerned towards conservation may historically have been true. But it need not be inevitable. If one believed it to be inevitable, the morality of the consequent policy prescription of keeping people poor so as to conserve their lifestyle will become suspect. 

On the other hand providing material incentives (both at individual  and community levels) without corresponding  incentives  for the conservation of cultural and sacred aspects of the  lifestyle of  the  indigenous people would destroy  their  identity,  their knowledge  systems  and  their confidence in  solving  their  own problems.  a  case  in point are the  reservations  for American Indian tribes in the USA. Excessive dependence on doles from the government leading to sedentary lifestyle and change in  dietary habits  has led to high incidence of diabetes and  obesity  among the residents of the reservations.

There is a close but not linear relationship between the traditional  lifestyles in  the  production of knowledge, innovation  and  practices  for conserving biodiversity. For instance, a lifestyle that  promotes close interaction between grandparents and grandchildren  through extended family systems may require different kind of  strategies for  knowledge production, reproduction and diffusion  over  time and space. The oral traditions and culture of communications  may be  extremely strong and valid.  Within oral traditions the  folkloric  traditions may be much more robust than simple  narration.  Once such family structures no more remain viable or  functional, similar strategies for knowledge production and diffusion may not be equally efficient.

And  yet  the knowledge produced in past may still be  valid  and relevant with or without modification for evolving future strategies of survival and sustainable development.

III  Conditions for Effective Implementation 

A    Cross‑sectoral effects of Incentives

Incentives/disincentives for sustainable resource use and biodiversity conservation could create side‑effects in  non‑targeted sectors in the following conditions:

1.	When  there are trade‑offs between interests of local  human and sentient beings which have not been balanced.

	e.g.  eco‑tourism:  Bhutan has put a restriction  on  the  number tourists  in order to limit the damage done to  the  environment. Another  way to limit the damage is to conduct eco‑tourism  in a manner  that both educates the tourist and at the same  time  ensures that the local flora and fauna are undisturbed. e.g.,  turtle sanctuary  of Costa Rica where tourists are obliged to  under  go training  for  a whole day and are allowed inside  the  sanctuary only under in the company of local guides.

	Conservation  of environment /ecology in turn generates a  demand for ecotourism. In Zermat, Switzerland, eco‑tourism got promoted because  the  community had developed a clean  environment‑  only three  cars  are allowed into the township which are  powered  by fossil  fuels. The rest are battery operated. People  here  still use  one  of the most environment friendly transport  i.e.  horse carriages. 

2.	When there are trade‑offs between more than one local goals and between short and long term goals.

	e.g.,  a  local innovation for extracting ground water in a more energy  efficient  way may lead to greater mining of water and abandonment  of local land races and varieties in preference  for modern  fertilizer responsive varieties. In such a situation  incentives  for the new technology, if not accompanied with  disincentives for mining the ground water, may lead to adverse agro‑e‑ecological  impacts, leading to a reduction in resilience  of  the farming system.

3.	When there are trade‑offs between local and national/global goals which have not been resolved/balanced.

e.g. disincentives for killing the wild ass in the buffer zone of its  sanctuary in Kutch, combined with disturbances in the  local habitat,  led to this protected animal becoming a major  pest  of the agricultural corps cultivated by farmers there. In this case the  externalities  of conservation are being borne by  the  poor communities  inhabiting the buffer zones. In the past their  efforts to solve the problem by requesting the Forest Department to come to their help has not resulted in any permanent solution  to the problem. 

4.	When  incentives  are targeted to components of  the  system with disregard to the linkages between components.

	For  instance  ban on grazing by local communities  in  Bharatpur bird sanctuary led to growth of tall grasses such as Paspalum and subsequent  reduction in opportunities for nesting of song  birds in  the  hollows formed by buffalo hoof marks (Vijayan,  1987  in Gadgil and Rao, 1996). The drop in the inflow of migratory  birds like  Siberian  cranes  could  also be  caused  in  part  because suitable  prey was now difficult to pick on. It was not  realized by  the conservators that the pastoralists in this case  had  co‑ evolved with the sentient beings of the sanctuary. Removing  them had  disturbed the ecological balance developed  over  centuries. Large scale violence around the issue of grazing which took place in  1982 (Gupta, 1982) has in retrospect shown the  futility  of Park without People approach of conservation (MCNeely, 1995). 

5.	When  incentives  are given with disregard to  the  carrying capacity of a given eco‑system or when there is a lack of  understanding/ knowledge of ecological boundaries e.g. a case in point is the tiger sanctuary in which decline of prey  within  the core area of the sanctuary led  to  the tigers coming out of the sanctuary in search of prey.

6.	Incentives  at  cross‑purposes: When two  or  more  national policies   with  associated incentives are at cross  purposes  or competing for the same resources e.g.  In 1993, the Gujarat government made a bid to delimit  some parts  of  the  Narayan Sarovar Sanctuary in  Kutch district  in response  to  pressures  from industrial lobby  which  wanted  to access  the land for mining of limestone. This sanctuary  is  the last preserve of the original Kutch thorn forest and home to  the highly  endangered Chinkara, a rare and beautiful gazelle.  Among the  other fauna threatened are the caracal, the desert cat,  the Indian  wolf,  the  pangolin, the great Indian bustard  and  the peafowl (Nambiar, 1993). 

	Designing of incentives/disincentives therefore calls for careful assessment  of  possible  cross‑sectoral  effects.  Environmental impact assessment of rural development interventions would become mandatory  in future. potential impact of various  incentives  on the  cultural  aspects and eco‑ethics of  the  local  communities should  also be assessed before implementation of projects/incentives.

B    Elimination of Perverse Incentives

Perverse incentives may result from failures of the market or  of government policies/ interventions. Perverse incentives give  the wrong  signals to potential users of eco‑friendly technology  and place  the innovators of such technology at a disadvantage.  Some measures for eliminating such incentives are suggested:

1.	Elimination of market imperfections and failures:

Free access to complete information: One way to improve  the access of local communities to information is the development  of local  knowledge  networks which are linked to  other  local  and global  networks. The  cost of developing  and  servicing  these knowledge  networks  could initially be borne by  global  funding agencies, until such time that the local communities are able  to make  contributions  to bear the cost  through improved  returns arising  from collaborative investments  in  bio‑diversity  with external partners.

Avoiding situations of monopoly: One suggestion to over come this  all  too familiar market imperfection is the  promotion  of decentralized,  poly‑centric entrepreneurship in the small/tiny scale  sector where ever possible. We are aware of at  least  one instance  where an ecopreneur in western Maharashtra, Mr. P.D.Uplenchwar is attempting to promote group  entrepreneurship  of this kind, by encouraging unemployed youth to set up small  units to manufacture a general purpose low cost herbal pesticide developed  by  him. His only conditions are that they  should  a)  not exploit the farmers and b) contribute part of their earnings to a common  fund  for research on new product  development  (Pastakia 1996)

Adoption  of  code of conduct that respects  the  rights  of indigenous  peoples as well as the rights of sentient and  future life:  In  this context it is worth recalling that  some  of  the concerned  Pew Scholars took an initiative in 1994   to  develop ethical guidelines for the prospecting of biodiversity (see Annex one). International agencies could use their good offices  in  influencing potential prospectors of biodiversity in following some form of ethical code of conduct. 

2.   Withdrawal of policies  that distort the pricing mechanism:

Elimination  of  subsidies  for technologies  and  land  use practices which lead to unsustainable outcomes, such as subsidies for  highly toxic chemical inputs. In Indonesia the  decision  to cut subsidies on chemical pesticides and ban fifty percent of the pesticides used in paddy in 1984 was largely instrumental in  the success of the National IPM (Integrated Pest Management)  Program there.  Within  five  years, as the subsidies  were  phased  out, pesticide consumption in paddy dropped  drastically. Contrary  to the expectations of skeptics, the productivity of paddy increased instead of decreasing (Gallagher 1992).

3.   Ecological  assessment of governmental  poverty  alleviation programmes  and withdrawal of ill conceived programmes  interventions

In south Gujarati the state government gave large number  of buffaloes  to adivasi population under IRDP programme.  Buffaloes are unsuited to the ecological conditions in most of these  areas which  have  hilly terrain. Also there is a shortage  of  fodder/ pasture  resources in some of the talukas, making  the  buffaloes  husbandry as an economic activity unviable. But for the interventions  of the Behavioral Science center a local NGO, the  project would have affected the ecological balance, and put large  number of "project beneficiaries" into a debt trap, making their economic position worse than before (Pastakia and Gupta 1996).

Avoidance  of standardized solutions while scaling  up  projects  of  rural development. One way is  to  consult  indigenous experts,  another is to generate such a  pluralistic  environment for  entrepreneurship  tat different biodiversity  resources  are used  at  various  places for  enterprise  development.  Periodic market  festivals  can  be  organized as done  by  Dastakar  (a national  guild of NGOs and others working with  rural artisans) for  rural  artisans  to generate  consumer  demand  for  diverse products. In the absence of such a support from consumers,  there is  very  little  chance  for  diversified  production  or  value addition systems to evolve and become viable. Weekly markets have been  another  forum  for  exchange  and  trade  of  such goods. Different  streets  in cities for instance  could be  closed  for vehicular  traffic  on different days so that  this  prime  space becomes available for petty vendors of biodiverse and other craft products.  Taking  markets closer to clients is the only  way  to compete  with  the mega sales and discount  strategies  of  large producers of standardized goods.

Counteracting  of  perverse advertisements on  the  TV  and other   media  which  promote  consumerism of primarily   non‑ sustainable  life  styles  and  use  of  high  entropy  and  eco‑ unfriendly  products.  e.g.,  Bhaskar bhai  an  organic  farmer  in Gujarat said "why can't we have advertisements on natural farming on ZEE ‑TV (or CNN) to compete with the ones inserted by private companies promoting chemical pesticides and fertilizers?"

C    Need for Appropriate Institutional Arrangements

1.   Restoring Community Rights

The  loss  of community rights of tribals  and  other  indigenous communities over  local resources such as forests, lakes, rivers, etc either to colonial powers or to the state has been one of the most serious among perverse incentives for biodiversity conservation. Hence restoration of community rights of indigenous  tribes and  communities for greater control over land and other  natural resources  would  seem to constitute a precondition  for  greater involvement of the local communities.

Rao  and  Gadgil (1995) have argued for a  scheme  of  community biodiversity   registers   for documenting and disseminating individual and collective ecological and technological  knowledge systems  at  village  level. For  certain  purposes  of  creating community  awareness, it is a very good initiative and can  go  a long  way  in  at  least  some  places  achieving  the  ends   of conservation. But as an incentive mechanism, we are not sure  how far  it  may  succeed.  Though in  the  spirit  of  diversity  of incentive  instruments for conserving diversity, we feel that  it must  be  given a fair trial. It may however, be useful  to  keep some of the limitations of this model in mind: (a) should  entire community become custodian of rewards or benefits that may accrue through  exchange,  or  value addition in the  knowledge  of  few disadvantaged  economically poor but knowledge rich  individuals?  (b)  if  the  poor individual innovators  or  local  experts  are unlikely to win any other race for rewards, should they lose  the race  for intellectual rewards too because they are  unlikely  to ever  occupy  the  decision  making  position  in  the  community councils,  (c)  studies  have  shown that  many  times  even  the neighbors  of an innovator do not know about the  innovation.  In such  circumstances, the innovator does not get much feedback  or appreciation from the peers. Registering such innovations may not necessarily  serve  as incentives or generate  peer  appreciation with  in  the village. There may be other similar  but  neglected innovators  who might constitute a more appropriate  peer  group. Thus community of innovators need not be co‑terminus with village boundaries,  and finally (d) why should knowledge  of  grassroots innovators  (particularly  the ones  who  produce  contemporary innovations) become a community property and be denied individual contractual  incentives  when knowledge of  corporate  sector  or individuals is not denied this privilege?

Ramakrishna's  study  on  shifting cultivation  system  in  north eastern  India,  (1989) shows how reduced community  rights  over land  made  the traditional system of  jhooming  non‑sustainable. When jhoom cycles were shortened due to restriction of the area in which this practice could be pursued it became non‑  sustainable. But then people identified the potential of alder tree which grew very fast and made short cycles relatively speaking  sustainable. This is an example where incentive for such innovations can  help deal with reduced access. But in cases where such a thing is  not possible,  the  people  have to be given  access  to  territories which help in maintaining ecological integrity. 

2.   Developing New Institutional Arrangements

A resource or technology may be in public or private domain.  Or, it  may be in use as a club good or as a common property  of  the community.  When an external agency makes an intervention  either to  access  knowledge  or biodiversity  for  extractive  or  non‑extractive  purposes,  it may change the status of  resource  and this would have serious implications for future access and  usage of the resource. Creative and appropriate institutional  arrangements would be needed to ensure that the change in status of  the resource  with  or without value addition, does not  deprive  the local  people of its future usage and results in  benefits  which are shared on an equitable basis.

The local communities may have to set up new institutions at  the community  level in order to improve their bargaining power  with external  partners,  and access external  resources,  skills  and information  for  conservation and  sustainable  exploitation  of local  biodiversity and knowledge. These institutions will  also have  to deal with the question of equitable sharing of  benefits within  the community. Some communities may need special help  as they may lack initially such organisational skills.

Networking  among  indigenous innovators and  conservators  is  a promising  kind  of institution for augmenting  the  capacity  of local  communities  to come out with  contemporary  solutions  to local  problems which incidentally also have national and  global benefits  on account of being eco‑friendly, resource  conserving,  resource augmenting etc.

3.   Strengthening Existing Local Institutions

Local  informal/sacred institutions have often been  a  way  of practicing the collective wisdom of local communities in  dealing with natural resources and sentient beings. The institutions  are under  tremendous strain. They must be strengthened where  possible, e.g. In Denmark, there is a folk song which advises the farmer to rake  the soil after harvest lightly, so that the birds  and  the poor could get their pick.

Another  example is the system of sacred groves found  in  Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Meghalaya and several other  parts of India (WWF, 1996).

4.   Tapping Socio‑religious Movements

New  religious  institutions  for  sustainable  natural  resource management  have also been initiated by  socio‑religious  leaders with a vision for sustainable society. e.g., the Swadhyay  movement started  by Pandurang Shastri. One of the new institutions  under this movement is the "Vruksha mandir" which is a sacred grove with  a difference.  Farmers from a cluster of villages select a plot  of marginal land and develop it into a grove with horticultural  and medicinal  plants  entirely through voluntary labour and with  a spirit  of  devotion. Harnessing the energies of  such  religious movements could be another way of promoting biodiversity  conservation.

D    Legal and Political Framework

While there is little disagreement on the issue of introducing  a law(s) to prevent the on‑going uncontrolled  exploitation of biodiversity within the country, the debate centers around the issue of the extent of regulation which would be possible or even desirable.  Too  much  of regulation would  inhibit foreign  and Indian  investors and prospectors who have the biotechnology  for bioprospecting.  On the other hand the absence of regulation  has led to over‑exploitation of species to the extent of driving some of the valuable species with medicinal properties to  extinction. In  the past private sector has shied away from the  prospect  of compensating  local communities for the resources  of  biodiverse nature  conserved by them over the generations. The same is  true for indigenous knowledge shared by the local people in good faith without attaching any price. 

Hence  the  regulations should be such that they do  not  involve lengthy bureaucratic procedures. As far as possible the  communities  directly involved should be allowed to negotiate  with  the external counterparts. However there should be  a  national  repository  where the contracts could be deposited and  scrutinized by the representatives of the state, so that they may  intervene in case the communities' interests  are short circuited. 

The  degree of regulation should be different for different  purposes  of exploitation and for different methods of  exploitation (Gupta, 1995).

                              			Method of Exploitation

                        		 extractive         	non‑extractive
                                           ___________________________________
	
                                         material    commercial          ethno‑biological

Purpose 
of Exploitation
               		      non‑          taxonomic/          ecological
               		      material     cytological         
                                          _____________________________________

Should  an  academic wanting to carry out a study  of  ecological nature  in  a bird sanctuary  aimed at generating  new  knowledge which may prove useful for the conservation of the sanctuary, for instance, (cell 4) be forced to meet the same legal  requirements as  a  private  company  wishing to develop a new  drug  through extractive  means  (cell 1)? If not, how should  the  regulations vary from one cell to another?

It  is  obvious that responsibility of outsiders will not  be  of similar  kinds in different roles and for different purposes.  It is acknowledged though that line of difference between different uses may be quite thin. For instance the description of a biological resource may generate opportunity for its eventual use. Thus what may begin as a pure academic activity  may turn out to be  a remunerative  exercise. This would call for eternal vigilance  on the part of local communities as well as state regulating  institutions. 

Total reliance on external control to modify individual behaviour is  neither  desirable nor feasible. It is in this  context  that strengthening  grassroots  institutions  and  value  systems  and grassroots movements  for eco‑ethical behaviour  are  of  utmost importance.

Flexibility of contracts:

Model  contracts for biodiversity prospecting have been drawn  up by  Putterman  (1996). Similar contracts could be  drawn  up  for prospecting of indigenous knowledge. The models should not  leave loop  holes for willful defaulters. At the same time they  should have built in flexibility of the following types:

1.	Contracts should be amenable to review at various stages of the collaboration. Four important stages have been identified  by Gupta  (1994)  as follows: i) initial access ii) when  the  first discovery  is made showing promise of future gains iii)   when  a prototype is developed iv) when the new product is commercialized

2.	Contracts  should leave options for either party to opt  out at any of the stages if they feel that the progress is  detrimental to their interest of if there has been a breach of  contract. In  case of a breach of contract signed with a community, if  the legal  system  is not responsive in settling  the dispute,  what alternative mechanisms could be tried?

3.	Contracts  should  allow the possibility of a third  party participation  at a later date, should the developments call  for such a participation.

Conclusion

Involvement Levels

The  degree  of involvement of the local communities  would  vary depending on the role they are able to play in the future activities  related  to either conservation or  exploitation  of  local 
resources. Three distinct models can be visualized, with increasing intensity of local participation and involvement:

I	Only Approval of local community: The external agency/partner  is  expected  to play the major role. However  it  needs  the approval  of  the local community before  commencing  to  exploit either the local resources ‑ be they material or non‑material in kind.

II   	Approval  and Consultation with local experts: The  external partners  consult  the local communities and obtain  their  prior informed  consent. They may also take advantage of the expertise of local experts from time to time.

III 	Approval and Partnership: The local communities are expected to  play  a  more dynamic role as compared to  the  previous  two models.  It is based on the assumption that local  people  either possess  the  expertise for the new activity of  conservation  or product development or have the capacity to absorb new skills and techniques.  Capacity building may form part of the terms of  the contract. 

Implications for Global Institutions

How can global institutions become more relevant for local actors and  their  ability  to participate in the development  process without  being forced to abandon traditional culture,  eco‑ethics and values which enabled them to conserve the natural wealth  for other communities as well as future generations in the past?

Three  roles for global institutions have been discussed  in  the past:

i)	Creating  a moral pressure on nations as is being done  currently through the Convention on Biodiversity.

ii)	Supporting  and  enabling the demonstration  of  alternative models of institutional arrangements

iii)	Serving  as  clearing house for  contracts  on  biodiversity  exploitation  (UNCTD 1996).

However these roles  do not enable global institutions to be linked directly with local initiatives:

Establishing  /promoting global knowledge networks of  local innovators and conservators, which enable members in one part  of the globe to learn from and adapt ideas to their local conditions from other parts, would be a tangible way for global institutions to get directly involved in development and conservation  initiatives  at  grassroots level. This strategy  would  enable  global actors  to "act globally and think locally". It would  also  help local  actors  to realise the global worth  of  their  innovative solutions.  Not only would this result in enhancement  of  their self worth and pride in their own creative capacity and knowledge systems, it would also enable them to negotiate well with  potential external users and partners for use of local resources. With more  and  more  nations opting for market  based economies  and reforms for liberalization the improved negotiation skills in the hands  of  local communities would go a long  way  in  augmenting their livelihood / survival strategies.

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Annexure One

Sub‑optimal Coping Strategies
leading to degradation of resources and
decline of biological diversity

                Land  based         		Livestock                		Off‑ farm

Private     Reduce fallow       		substitution             		excessive           
                period,             			of indg. breeds          		extraction
                tractorization                               				of medicinal
                and decline of     		shift in species        		plants from
                spontaneously       		to small ruminants       		forests,
                sprouted tree                                				removal of soil 
                and shrubs          		declining pasture        		& brick kilns,
                cultivation of      		quality; invasion        		use of synth.
                marginal lands,     		woody species            		tannins for
                excessive lopping                            				leather,
                of trees, extrac‑   		unregulated              		textile dyes,
                tion of biomass     		grazing in sanc‑    
                mass,such as roots  		tuaries             
                of trees, shrubs    
                for fuel, coal etc.,
                low quality water   
                use, imbalanced use 
                of nutrients, chem.
                inputs,substitution 
                of land races,
                etc.,               
                              
CPR         decline of instt.,  
sacred       excessive harvest 
Grove       of biomass, 

Public     weak monitoring of
                adverse industrial
                impact
                open access; lack 
                of institutions

Protected disruption of natural habitats